AFRICA AS THE CENTRE PIECE OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

AFRICA AS THE CENTRE PIECE OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

ABSTRACT

Over the years, Nigeria had lived with the big name and informal recognition as the ‘giant of Africa’. Perhaps her population might, of about 140 million, the largest in Africa, and her reputable oil wealth, have placed this diplomatic privilege in clear perspective. In acquiescence, Nigeria had variously lived more than this expectation. The country had overwhelmingly given both solicited and unsolicited supports to African neigbours: intervened positively in their internal crisis, provided humanitarian services, doled out billions of dollars as charity, sent technical aid corps, formed and sent military supports, and so on. In most cases, these flamboyant gestures were defiantly done against home interest and survival. However, there seems to be a disconnect between what is given out and what is given in return. Therefore, this paper seeks to build a linkage between Nigeria’s flamboyant foreign policy thrust in Africa and the ironical diminishment of Nigeria’s prominence and economic value both home and abroad. The qualitative mechanism of data collection and analysis is applied. We argue that the superfluous involvement of Nigeria in Africa’s problems, in defiant of home problems, aimed at acquiring cheap fame, rather makes her unpopular and diminishes whatever prestige that had been built already. Not only that, these beneficiary countries never appreciate such, they rather sabotage Nigeria’s interest in global politics in recompense. It is observed, also, that in the present, Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust has not shifted radically from the ‘Africa centerpiece’ bent. We conclude that for Nigeria to achieve genuine economic and political standing/reputation, a holistic revision and redirection of this blind focus on Africa is highly imperative.

INTRODUCTION
Since the independence of Nigeria in 1960, there have been a plethora of conceptual ideological transitions in the Nigeria foreign policy machinery. Essentially, they all strive towards an epistemological construction and definition of the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy. These conceptualizations are often regime specific and borne out of a psychological hunger to carve a regime identity that will create and leave lasting impressions on the minds of Nigerians. They are not necessarily products of deep and profound philosophical reflections. This crisis of myownism (regime identity) is one of the major causative agencies of project abandonment and public policy failure in Nigeria.

The concepts that have bestraddle foreign policy thought in Nigeria, in both official and non-official parlance are: national consensus in foreign policy, dynamic foreign policy, Africa as the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, concentric cycles, concert of medium powers, economic diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy among many others. These conceptual mutations in Nigerian foreign policy engineering, we contend, lack any ideological consistency, operationally barren, philosophically vague, and such, an exercise in conceptual confusion and groping in the dark. We will assess some of these concepts one after the other in what follows.

DYNAMIC FOREIGN POLICY

The concept of a dynamic foreign policy first crept into intellectual discourse on Nigerian foreign policy in the first republic. It was on the occasion of the parliamentary debates of Nigeria foreign policy, wherein the then Foreign Minister Hon. Aja Wachukwu moved a motion that: ‘this honourable house reaffirms the foreign policy of the Federal Government as declared by the Right Hon. Prime Minister and approved on the 20th August, 1960 by this honourable house and hereby declares its approval of the government’s interpretation and conduct thereof, and congratulates the government on its achievement in the international field since the independence of this country’.

In his response to motion, the then shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Anthony Enahoro moved an amendment to this motion to read that: ‘the Honourable House is of the opinion that the foreign policy of the Federal Government as declared by the Prime Minister and approved on 20th August, 1960 by this Honourable House lacks dynamism and regrets that the Government’s interpretation and conduct thereof is out of step with progressive opinion in Africa’ (emphasis mine).

In retort, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Hon. Aja Wachukwu, went on to reel out the foreign policy engagements of Nigeria and how these engagements were dynamic and that if these measures were not dynamic, then he doesn’t know what dynamic constitutes.

By putting the concept of dynamism at the centre of this discourse, particularly making it appear as a core requirement of any foreign policy endeavour, the streak of dynamism gained currency as a fundamental basis of foreign policy making and evaluation in Nigeria. The debate failed to operationalize the concept of dynamism and its utility and importance in the foreign policy process. The closest statement that pointed towards a conceptual operationalization was Anthony Enahoro’s radical rhetoric that subaltern groups in the country ‘represent the true voice and true temper of the people of the country’ and that as such any foreign policy measure outside of their sympathies is ‘lacking in inspiration, it is not dynamic’.

Precisely what dynamism entails in foreign policy making in Nigeria has not been vigorously outlined. However, the opposition and radical rhetoric of Anthony Enahoro and his interpretation of dynamism has left a lasting impression on the conceptualization of Nigeria’s foreign policy. As such, it is the case that foreign policies of successive administration are seen as either being conservative or dynamic. While the Balewa, Gowon and Shagari administrations were deemed conservative, that of Murtala/Obasanjo, Obasanjo/Yaradua are deemed dynamic. Because of the public appeal of the appellation of radicalism/dynamism, it is politically faddish for successive regimes since independence to tag their foreign policies as a being dynamic. It need be stated however that, a nation’s national interests, not the effusions of dynamism or its lack thereof that is the barometer of measuring its foreign policy.

AFRICA AS THE CENTRE PIECE OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

The idea of Africa as the centre piece of Nigeria foreign policy is premised on the understanding that Nigeria’s engagement in the international system will be looked at through the binoculars of Africa. As Hon. Aja Wachukwu averred on the imperative an Afrocentric policy, ‘charity begins at home and therefore any Nigerian foreign policy that does not take into consideration the peculiar position of Africa is unrealistic’. This enunciation is the philosophical origins of Afrocentrism in Nigeria’s foreign policy thought; it was however, the Adedeji Report that coined the concept: ‘Africa as centre-piece’.

The issues that gave practical expression to this African-centeredness were the remnants of colonialism on the continent, apartheid in South Africa, liberation wars, ideological and proxy conflicts among others. Outside these politically pressing factors, the issue of a shared racial universe, of cultural neighbourhood, of shared historical experiences and the ideals of pan-Africanism further lubricated the wheels of this foreign policy conceptualization. Indeed, in the pursuing an Africa-centered foreign policy premised on racial and socio-cultural affinity of Africans, Nigeria was carrying out an exercise in anthropological diplomacy.

Under the framework of an Africa-centered foreign policy, Nigeria got involved deeply in the decolonization struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa and in the process earning for itself the appellation a ‘frontline nation’, even though she was geographically far removed from the theater of the struggles which was in the Southern African region. Nigeria is central to the formation of ECOWAS, has contained the breakdown of social order in Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc, through its world acknowledged peacekeeping expertise, and has provided economic life wire to less economically resourceful countries. In terms of proactive engagement with major socio-political and economic issues of continental importance in the last fifty one years, Nigeria tower far above any other African country.

Since this phraseology appeared on the Nigeria foreign policy scene, it has continued to reproduce itself, like the ever recurring mathematical decimal. The foreign policy elite and political leadership of successive governments seems to be carried away by its philosophical allure rather than its rational ideation. In this sense, therefore, considerations of the economic benefits, continental political leadership, national interests, and military partnerships and strategic engagements are sacrificed on the altar of good neighbourliness and psychological gratification. I need to make a comment on the issue of psychological gratification. This issue has to do with the psychological construction and mentality of Nigerians that verge on bigmanism, show-off and materialism. Beneath all these however, lies a massively gigantic emptiness and inferiority complex. Most often, the flagrant display of materialism among Nigerians is a product of psycho-social insecurity. Exported to the international arena, in this sense, Nigeria wants to present an image of a big brother image before the other African countries.

This reason accounts for why inspite of the huge financial expenditures and massive loss of human and material resources in the Liberian and Sierra Leone wars, for instance, Nigeria has not been able to reap any economic benefits. To date, one cannot tell one single Nigerian company involved in the post-conflict reconstruction activities going on in these two countries. What major economic niche has Nigeria carved for herself in these post-conflicts countries? There is hardly anything one can point finger towards. Yet, the Africa-centeredness framework has continued to maintain a stronghold on foreign policy thinking in Nigeria. The theories of concentric cycles and concert of medium powers all take their bearing from this perspective. In sum, the concept of Africa as a center piece of Nigeria foreign policy is also not grounded in considerations of economic growth and national development, and as such no matter how conceptually lush it may be, it remains substantially empty.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

The concept of economic diplomacy as a foreign policy plank was introduced in Nigeria foreign policy during the Ibrahim Babangida administration. The government conceptualized economic diplomacy policy as, ‘the promotion of export trade, investment and increased financial assistance from friendly countries’. Building on this, the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Ike Nwachukwu in his June 1988 speech entitled: The Dynamics of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, provided the policy direction when he stated that, ‘ it is the responsibility of our foreign policy apparatus to advance the course of our national economic recovery’.

The imperative of an economic diplomacy foreign policy framework was inspired by the economic pressures that were exerted on the Nigerian economy as a result of the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The focus was on export promotion, encouragement of direct foreign investment, debt rescheduling, embracing of neo-liberal economic measures and deep involvement in the interplay of the capitalist international political economy. The political wing of economic diplomacy agenda was that Nigeria will ingratiate itself and cultivate the goodwill and friendship of the leading countries of Europe, North America and Japan.

There is absolutely nothing new about the economy being used as a major component of a nation’s foreign policy endeavours. For students of foreign policy, the linkage theory is an elementary explanation of how internal factors help in shaping and giving definition to the quality and direction of foreign policy. It was mere hype. Secondly, Nigeria lacked the economic infrastructure to use economy as a major instrument of diplomatic engagement. This is so because the productive forces in the economy are grossly underdeveloped, there is the dearth of capital, a lack of entrepreneurial ingenuity; the economy is monoculturally dependent on oil, politicized, corrupt and rent oriented. It is part of the problem that Nigeria has not been able to make economic gains from her foreign policy adventures, particularly in the sub-region.

Again, no foreign policy agenda can succeed on the basis of reliance on a single factor, such as the economy. Foreign policy is borne out of a multiplicity of factors, such as; culture, politics, history, patriotism, geography, military power, etc. indeed, the very basis of embarking on economic diplomacy in the first place was the inability of the Nigerian economy to withstand pressures of the international political economy in the first place.

CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

Citizen diplomacy is the foreign policy thrust that has been embarked upon since the advent of democratic governance in 1999. It was spearheaded by the Olusegun Obasanjo and has been in place since then through the administrations of Musa Yar’Adua and Jonathan Goodluck. Basically, citizen diplomacy contends that the citizens, that is, Nigerians are the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Commenting on what the concept is all about, Ozoemenam Mbachu, posits that, ‘the basic thrust revolve around concern for the basic needs, human rights and socio-economic welfare of Nigerian citizens in conducting bilateral and multilateral engagements with other countries’.

Through the instrumentality of the citizen diplomacy, it is envisaged that Nigeria will harness the resources and potentials of her diaspora, mainstream the doctrine of reciprocity, and create an enabling environment for her citizens to prosper and engage in broad issues of human importance at both the national and international levels. In the event too, it will enhance Nigeria’s export portfolio and attract foreign direct investments.

According to Mbachu again, critical issues that have been left unanswered by the citizen diplomacy policy thrust and for which if clear answers are not provided could endanger it are: a.) what are the objectives of Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral economic and political cooperation based on the framework of citizen diplomacy? b.)What should be the benefits of citizen diplomacy as a functional framework for bilateral and multilateral cooperation? c.)Who would aggregate the inputs of Nigerians in the diaspora? d.) How would the success or failure of citizen diplomacy be measured and by whom?

While aligning myself to these questions, let it be asked: Is the social responsibility of the State not primarily targeted at creating a conducive atmosphere for the citizens’ fulfillment of their potentials, and realization of their yearnings and aspirations? This is the philosophical foundations of the state as encapsulated in the doctrine of social contractarianism. If so, which it is, no doubt, what is special about citizen diplomacy as a conceptual framework of foreign policy? Since 1999, to date, what can we point at and say this is the benefit(s) of citizen diplomacy? Again, the answer is nothing.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AFRICA AS CENTER PIECE OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Nation-states all over the world design and implement foreign policies in order to guide their external relations as well as protect, promote and defend their vital national interests in areas such as defense of territorial integrity, the promotion of economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests and whatever a country might consider as its vital national interest. It is therefore naturally expected that Nigeria’s foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her national interest which should ordinarily serve to either justify or repudiate the nation’s action or inaction in the international relations.

Since the first republic, Nigeria’s foreign policy had been largely Afro-centric in posture. In an official statement just before independence, on August 20, 1960, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa at the Federal House of Assembly stated that Nigeria was, “adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa; it will be our aim to assist any country to find solution to its problem.”

Similarly, one significant event that took place under late General Ironsi’s regime was the June 1966 Ambassadors’ Conference held in Lagos to re-examine the premises and directions of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

Among many other things, the conference re-dedicated Nigeria to the total emancipation of all African territories still under colonial tutelage and racial discrimination. This position was further reinforced when General Ironsi stated that, “in the whole sphere of external relations, the Government attaches greatest importance to our African policy” (Al-Hassan, 2008).

It is under the above foreign policy directions, among others, that Nigeria ventured in to the complex theatre of international relations. This position could be appreciated when we consider the fact that successive regimes in Nigeria accorded significant attention to Africa as the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy. However, a cursory look at the various engagements made by Nigeria towards an African agenda in areas such peace keeping missions, decolonization of the continent as well as other bilateral and multilateral aid she rendered in the continent, would to a very large extent show that the omnibus nature of the principle of African centeredness in the Nigerian foreign policy does not appear to be well aligned to the country’s national interests or has not served the national interest in a commensurate measure.

Nigeria has been in the forefront in the establishment and sustaining various continental and regional organizations. For instance, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established on May 25, 1963, was primarily aimed at achieving two important objectives, namely: to ensure the quick decolonization of the remaining colonies in Africa and secondly to facilitate the rapid socio-economic growth and development of African states. In this respect, Nigeria did a lot in ensuring the implementation of the primary objectives upon which OAU was founded. For instance, in 1975, Nigeria granted the sum of N 13.5 million and military assistance to Angola’s MPLA and also enlisted diplomatic support for the Angolan government within the O.A.U.; this had greatly accorded recognition to the Angolan government by many African states who were hitherto unwilling to give such recognition. In the case of Angola, Nigerian won but at what cost? And in whose interest? Is it in the national interest of Nigeria? Well we have to turn to the man who was at the centre of all this for an answer.

According to Joe Garba Nigeria’s External Affairs Commissioner then; Now, here was twenty million dollars in cash going to Angola without even a discussion of what Nigeria might gain, or even what uses it would be put to. Some might argue that to think of a quid pro quo from a country fighting for survival verges on the immoral, but two years later, no one could pin down a ‘normal’ Angola to any firm bilateral economic agreement (Garba, 1991).

This might be seen as a case of acting before thinking, which Nigeria’s diplomacy over the years has been for. How can a nation where over half of its citizens are living below the poverty line continue to waste resources on ‘gifts’ and ‘grants’ to ‘needy’ countries, without thinking about her own needy citizens or the benefits to her. In fact, in international politics there is no free dinner, every ‘favor’ done ideally is targeted at a future benefit. But on the obverse, the Angolan case was clearly a mere thinking of pride, about being the ‘giant of Africa’ and about being the big brother. Despite all Nigeria did for Angola, Nigeria’s name was conspicuously absent from the list of countries that Angola paid tribute for assisting them in their independence struggle in their first appearance at the OAU Summit in Mauritius in July 1976. To cap it all, after Murtala’s death, it took Angola the whole of three weeks to express their condolence over the death of their benefactor. “When eventually the message did arrive from Angola, only its first three sentences made any reference to our tragic loss. The remainder contained another shopping list” (Garba, 1991).

Also, Nigeria tried so very hard, but quite unsuccessfully to conclude an agreement with the Angolan government to allow Nigerian trawlers fish off the Angolan coast. Despite the numerous delegations that went for this agreement, their discussions were inconclusive. Later, the Angolans granted the Russians exclusive fishing right in the coast. In this consideration Joe Garba had asked thus: What, after all did Nigeria gain? High visibility in the international community; an awakening of our government officials as to what serious lobbying involved; and rallying a large percentage of our population to an international cause. But in bilateral terms which are, after all, the core of relations between states, we gave and gave to Angola, and in return got nothing.

Nigeria’s deep involvement in African affairs, a pursuit that had cost the country huge financial and human resources could be seen from other endeavours undertaken by the country in other African states. Nigeria’s involvement in the ECOWAS military intervention group, ECOMOG, is a near example. As desirable as it was to bring peace and stability to the West African sub-region, the venture had cost the nation enormous financial recourses and unspecified number of troops who lost their lives. Also, Nigeria lost about 44 soldiers in a ghastly motor accident along Gombe-Potiskum road in 2009. It could be recalled that the soldiers were just back from peace-keeping operations in Darfur. What a national tragedy in an attempt to keep peace in a sister African

country. The above scenario was succinctly captured by Ambassador F. George who stated that, “The historic contributions of Nigeria to regional peace missions in Liberia and Sierra-Leon which cost the country the whooping sum US$ 10 billion, not to mention the gallant men and women of Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of peace, are hardly acknowledged by the international community”. He further emphasized that this does include the sum of about US$ 90 billion that Nigeria single-handedly incurred in the OAU Peace Keeping Force that was deployed to Chad in 1980s. This is in addition to the sum of US$ 800 million Nigeria Trust Fund established under African Development Bank, ADB, to assist African countries obtain soft loan to execute vital projects (George, 1990, cited in Al-Hassan, 2008). Surprisingly, it is with connivance of some of these African states that Nigeria was denied the presidency of ADB in an election that was held right on Nigerian soil. What a back-stab.

The 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa where Nigerians were brutalized tempted one to ask if Nigerians deserve such brutality taking into consideration the fundamental role played by the country in dismantling apartheid. Eke (2009:138) informed that Nigeria-South Africa’s relations has been marked with discrimination against Nigerians in South Africa. He noted that the Nigeria’s consulate in South Africa confirmed that many Nigerians were killed in the 2007 extra-judicial circumstances, besides cases of harassment, intimidation and brutalization by South Africa police and security agencies. Also, the torture of a Nigerian, Mr. Adumekwe, by the

Gabonese security agents who were said to have set his back on fire for 20 minutes is a big slap to Nigeria. Therefore, taking into cognizance the contributions made by Nigeria towards African peace and development, one fundamental question that needs to be raised is, upon all these enviable roles and contributions which Nigeria made in the continent, can the nation afford to continue pursuing an African agenda at such a monumental cost without visible tangible benefits to the country and the country’s national interest?

In fact, it seems that there is apparent disconnect between national interest and Nigeria-Africa relations. It is apparent that the nation is doing too much in the African continent without corresponding positive outcome. According to Al-Hassan (2008), this phenomenon had attracted several comments by commentators on Nigeria’s external relations. For instance, a policy and economic affairs analyst, Dr. Obadiah Mailafiya while commenting on the Nigerian foreign policy framework, graphically captures the above scenario when he says that “ the centerpiece of any country’s foreign policy ought to be that country itself if it seriously considers itself a rational actor on the world stage…Every single action shall be adjudged by how much it advances our national power and influence and how much it advances our interests, objectives, and purposes”. Similarly, Eke noted that another international relations expert, Professor Inno Ukaeje, while commenting on Nigerian foreign policy has this to say: “Our false generosity abroad and penury at home are proof that we are pretending to be what we are not, because in reality we have been overstretching ourselves”. One seems to agree with the above assertions, taking into consideration the enormous funds the nation expends in trying to solve various problems in Africa while internally, almost all the sectors in the country are yearning for massive injection of funds and above all the standard of living has been grossly low. Although Nigeria is rich in strategic mineral resources through which the nation earned excessive wealth with which it funds several activities towards solving other African problems, the scale of such expenditure greatly hurts our domestic aspirations. Unfortunately, the Buhari’s administration which tried to portray Nigeria’s interest first in its foreign policy thrust by closing the border in order to arraign perpetrators of corruption, and stamp out illegal oil business and money laundering was highly criticized for being

inhuman and acting against the Nigeria’s West African brothers.

Conclusion
It is apparent that the successive Nigerian leadership has overwhelmingly recognized Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Thus, this directed their foreign policy thrust over the years. However, our study has found that this over burdensomeness of Nigeria’s foreign policy towards the cause of Africa at all times has not really benefited Nigeria; as such they have inadvertently acted against Nigeria’s national interest rather, as Joe Garba (1991) noted “…in bilateral terms which are, after all, the core of relations between states, we gave and gave to Angola, and in return got nothing”.

In fact, the era of decolonization has gone and as such Nigeria should seek effective trade engagement with other African countries if it must, and such engagement should foremost portray our national interest with some concomitant pay offs. Nigeria should in fact, seek a more global partnership that will ensure human development and economic prosperity for the country.

However, while we accept and encourage Nigeria’s active involvement in a productive engagement/ commitment in Africa which would yield to development in the region such as Nigeria’s role and initiative in drawing up the Constitutive Act of African Union (AU), The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism, Nigeria should seek first economic development after which every other thing shall be added unto her.

Nigeria’s attention should be more focused towards achieving our vital national interests such as socio-economic growth and development so as to improve the standard of living of the populace. In this respect, Africa should no longer be the only reason for the existence of our external relations.

Lastly, there is an urgent need for the government to convene a foreign policy summit to, among others, address issues such as re-defining our national interest, refocusing our foreign policy in such a way that it will radically shift from focusing on Africa as the centerpiece of its foreign policy but to a purely national interest driven foreign policy thrust which we will minimize loss and increase gains as well as tying it to the socio-economic growth and development of our great country.

We have demonstrated that since independence to date, although there have been conceptual and doctrinal transitions in Nigeria foreign policy, in reality they are not grounded in deep philosophical thought, visionary imagination and broad based considerations of long lasting benefits to the national interests. Basically, there are borne out of pragmatic exigencies, political faddism, conceptual elegance and regime identity. As a result, Nigeria’s foreign policy fifty one years down the road can be summed up to be change and continuity, motion without movement, dynamism without surge.

Therefore, it is clear that the Nigeria’s acclaimed big brother role in Africa, which encourages her to flamboyantly waste scarce resources on unfruitful brotherly missions in Africa only gained her a cheap popularity as the giant of Africa without any recorded tangible economic prosperity. Hence, we strongly recommend that Nigeria should seek first ‘economic development’ and then every other things shall be added unto her.

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