SOLD BY: LIMITATION OF ACTION IN VOCATION MATTERS
Limitation of action in vocation matters with references
a. Application of limitation law to claim compensation
b. Application of limitation to challenges revocation
c. Application of revocation to intervening period of negotiation
d. The constitution nature of limitation law
Limitation of Action in Revocation Matters
“The law of limitation is a law relating not to the substance of the cause of action but to procedure. Hence it follows a consequence which is important in private international law, namely that these enactments belong to the lex fori, not to lex contractus, and are binding on all persons who seek their remedy in the court of this country”.
The limitation law generally prescribes the period within which an action can be instituted. An action cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period once a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which such an action must be commenced. An action brought outside such stipulated period offends against the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. Because of the nature of the law of limitation, it is important that actions be instituted on time as failure to do so could rob the Court of its jurisdiction to adjudicate on the cause of action. This is so because the defence of limitation law relates to the jurisdiction of court. And jurisdiction being a threshold issue affecting the competence of the court to adjudicate can be raised at anytime in the proceedings of the courts.
In order to determine the period of limitation, one has to look at the write of summons and the statement of claim and compare the averments in the statement of claims as to date the wrong was committed with the date the write of summons was filed. If the period between those two events is longer than the period prescribed by the relevant law as the period of limitation, the action is statute barred. The verification of the fact of whether an action is statute barred can be done by a court without taking oral evidence from witnesses.
It is pertinent to state that a statute of limitation removes the right of action; the right of enforcement, the right to judicial and leaves the plaintiff with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce. Where an action has become barred by operation of the Limitation Law or Act, the effect is that the cause of action becomes extinguished by operation of law and can no longer be maintained in the courts.
Application of Limitation Law to Claim for Compensation
The Act under which revocation of right of occupancy could be effected today did not specify a time limit for the payment of compensation where such is payable under section 29 of the Act. The 1999 CFRN also only provides for prompt payment of compensation where personal rights or interests in movable and immovable property respectively have been compulsorily acquired. There appears to be no limitation as to when the claimant could enforce his right to payment of compensation under the two laws.
Notwithstanding, it is advisable that such a claim should be brought timeously. First, a notice of revocation always contains a specified period during which claim must be lodged with the acquiring authority where the revocation is for public purpose and in respect of which compensation is payable. Secondly, where such specific time limit is not indicated, the applicable Limitation Laws and the Rules of Court could be invoked to bar the payment of a compensation claim if such claim is not brought within a reasonable length of time.
In Oloto Attorney General, the plaintiff/appellant brought a claim for compensation in 1948 in respect of one his parcel of land at Iddo, which was compulsory, acquired between 1891-1903 pursuant to section 3 and 4 of the Petitions of Right Ordinance Cap 167 Laws of Nigeria. One of the issues determined at the Supreme Court was whether the Statute of Limitation Act 1623 applied to the appellant’s claim for compensation even though the claim was instituted pursuant to the Petitions of Right Ordinance. Thus the court had to determine whether the present suit constituted an “action” and was therefore within the meaning contemplated in the Limitation Act, 1623. The court considering the meanings of action concluded that the crown could take advantage of the Limitation Act of 1623 in suits brought under section 3 and 4 of the Petitions of Right Ordinance. The statute of limitation was therefore expressly made applicable to the claim for compensation and as a result of which the appellant’s claim was held to be statute barred.
In Fadare V A-G, Oyo the Appellants pieces of land which comprised thousands of acres of land and which spread beyond Ibadan were compulsorily acquired and included in Acquisition F vide government Notice of 8th August, 14931 and published in the Nigerian Gazzette No 60 of 5th November, 1931. In their Writ and Claim, the appellants sought for payment of adequate compensation. The respondents raised a preliminary objection pursuant to Order 22 rules 2 and 3 Civil Procedure Rules Western Nigerian applicable in Oyo state, that the action was both the trail and the Court of Appeal upheld the objection hence this appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court inter alia held as follows:
“As regards the claim for compensation by the appellants, there can be no argument that it was statute barred. The appellants clearly slept on their rights, if any. It is conceded by the appellants that the lands in issue were included in Acquisition ‘F’ vide notice…. Mr Fasusi in the course of argument in this court conceded that the cause of action arose when the appellants knew of the acquisition of the lands in issue and this he said was in 1940. Time begins to run when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed”.
Hence the Supreme Court concluded that the appellants failed to comply with section 10 of the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance. From the above decision, one can safely deduces that any application for claim of compensation brought after an unreasonable length of time could be statute barred depending on the prevailing law.
Application of limitation law to challenge of revocation of right of occupancy
It is not unusual for a holder of a revoked right of occupancy to wanting to challenge the dispossession of his property in court. The issue for examination would be: whether and when would limitation law operate to bar a former holder from challenging the revocation of his right of occupation. We shall examine some case law to answer this very important question.
In the case of the administration of the estate of Abacha vs Eke spiff & Ors, the plaintiff alleged that he was granted a building lease in aspect of a certain plot at Port Harcourt by the Rivers State Government in 1975 and without any prior notice, the state’s military administrator revoked his building lease and re-allocated the plot to late General Abacha In 1977. A multi story building was erected on the plot without his consent. All these facts the plaintiff discovered in 1996 after he recovered from a protracted illness and returned to Port Harcourt. The defendants challenged the competence of the action on the ground that it was statute barred.
The trail court found for the plaintiff and granted all the reliefs sought. Dissatisfied, the defendants/appellants appealed to the Court of appeal. On appeal, Section 3 and 34 of the Real Property Limitation Act of England 1833 came under search light.
The Court of Appeal agreed that by the cumulative effect of the sections, statutory period began to run against the owner of land from the date in which his right of action accrued but differed on when such right of action accrued in the instant case.
For ease of reference, the relevant and equivalent sections in the Limitation Law of Lagos State are reproduced here under:
16(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, no action shall be brought by a State authority to recover any land after the expiration of twenty years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the state authority, or if it first accrued to some person through whom the state authority claims, to that person.
(2) The following provisions shall apply to an action by person to recover land-
(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this subsection, no such action shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.
17. Where the person bringing an action to recover land, or some person through whom he claims, has been in possession thereof and has while entitled thereof been dispossessed or has discontinued his possession, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.
21. On the expiration of the period fixed by this law for any person to bring an action to recover land, the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.
The above dissenting opinion of His Lordship in the Administrator of the Estate of Abacha vs Eke-Spiff and Ors appears to have gained Supreme Court support in the recent case of Elabanjo V Dawodu. The apex court replying on its earlier decision in Akibu Azeez reiterated that knowledge of the true owner of land of the adverse possession of another is essential to the success of the equitable defenses of laches and acquiescence but that it is not material under limitation law. Hence knowledge of trespass or adverse possession is not a pre-condition to a successful plea of the limitation law. In other words, a party who pleads the defence that an action is statute barred need not satisfy the court that the plaintiff had knowledge of the trespass or adverse possession.
i. That knowledge of the true owner of land of the adverse possession of another is not essential for successful plea o statute of limitation;
ii. A state authority has 20 years within which to bring an action to recover land (whereas other persons have 12 years to bring the action);
iii. That the right of action to recover land shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.
iv. A successful plea of the application of limitation law to an action to recover land extinguishes the title of the other person or high right to the land.
Application of Limitation to Intervening Period of Negotiation
There are instances where rather than take legal remedy in compelling the payment of compensation; affected persons would be seeking administrative recourse. It is possible that in the process, years are lost and when such administrative measures fail to produce the expected result, a case is then instituted in court to compel the acquiring body to either pay compensation or declare the revocation null and void. The issue that arises here is: whether time continues to run during such intervening period for the purpose of determining limitation period.
Save where there is any agreement to the contrary, generally speaking time begins to run for the purpose of the limitation law when is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.
Revocation of a right of occupancy is not premised on any agreement between the acquiring body and the owner of the revoked right. Time for the purpose of limitation law would therefore begin run from the date the holder of the revoked right had knowledge of or received the revocation notice. Even where the claim for compensation is forwarded to the acquiring body within the time stipulated in the notice, time should be constructed to have started running. In Fadare Vs A.G. Oyo State, the Supreme Court held that at the time the acquisition of the Lands in issue in 1931, the limitation law applicable in the old western region.
The Constitutional Nature of Limitation Law
A poser that arises for consideration is whether a law that prescribes time limit for the institution of certain actions is not unconstitutional. The ground for this presumption is hinged on the belief that such law infringes on fundamental human right of a citizen to fair hearing amongst other rights. The Supreme Court answered this power in the negative in the case of Okere vs Amadi. One of the issues for determination was whether section 25 of the Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law of Imo State, 1981 which prescribes a 21day time limit within which an action could be commenced to challenge anything done under that law is not unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeal upheld the argument that the provision restricted the people’s access to court and as such was in conflict with the provision of section 6(1) & (2) & (4) and 236 of the 1979 constitution. On further appeal to the apex court, that court overruled the Court of Appeal decision and held that the 1979 constitution referred to do not proscribe any legislation which prescribes the time within which action could be commenced; and that it was quite appropriate for a state government to enact laws prescribing time limit within which disputes relating to appointment of chiefs within the State could be challenged as in the instant case. The constitutionality or otherwise of limitation laws appear to have been settled.
REFERENCES
Owie V Ighiwi (2005) All FWLR Pt 248 1762 at 1770, Ratio 12. In the case the Supreme Court held that since it was the appellant’s trespass on the land in dispute in 1985 that prompted the action against the appellant, the cause of action arose in that year and reckoning from that time to 17/2/88 when action was instituted, it is only a period of less than 12years within which the action could have been commenced pursuant to section 6920 of the limitation law of Bendel State.
Cap FB Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004
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